Call 1-800-949-4ADA
for Technical Assistance

Legal E-Bulletin - February 2002

Toyota Motor Mfg, KY, Inc. v. Williams: A Decision Summary

Much has been written in the media about the Supreme Courts decision in Toyota v. Williams, 000 U.S. 00-1089 (2002), and the cases’ damaging effect on the scope of the ADA. The headlines and commentary by the mainstream media on the decision do much more damage than the outcome of the case itself; because they wrongly lead people to believe that whole classes of persons with disabilities are now foreclosed from the protection of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Headlines such as "Supreme Court limits disabilities law in unanimous decision"1  and commentary in articles stating that,  “People who develop a type of injury caused by such repetitive actions as chopping chicken carcasses or hammering away at computer keyboards cannot sue their employers to force workplace accommodations under the Americans With Disabilities Act, the Supreme Court ruled,”2 have the potential to do greater harm than the actual decision because of the chilling effect these portrayals could have. The media focuses on the barriers in the decision; attorneys and potential complainants reading these articles may be more reluctant to pursue an ADA claim. 

It is important for persons with disabilities, advocates and attorneys to understand the true import of the decision and what one must now do in order to prove disability status in different venues and when bringing suit.  It should serve as a rubric for attorneys litigating ADA claims because it somewhat more clearly outlines the factors, and evidence that must be brought to make a successful ADA claim.
  
Key Points

Summary of the Case:

Williams was an assembly worker who has carpal tunnel syndrome, which prevented her from doing some of the tasks associated with her job without pain.  She alleged that her syndrome prevented her from gripping tools and doing repetitive work with her arms at or above shoulder level at work and was also substantially limited her in the major life activities of performing manual tasks, housework, gardening, playing with her children, and lifting. She sued Toyota for failing to reasonably accommodate her by assigning her to a position without these painful tasks.

The district court found that she had an impairment but that she did not demonstrate that it substantially limits any major life activity. It did not find that gardening, doing housework, and playing with children are major life activities, but did agree that performing manual tasks, lifting, and working are major life activities.

Williams appealed to the 6th Circuit on all issues except the courts ruling that gardening, housework, and playing-with-children were not major life activities. The Sixth Circuit had held3  that that in order for Williams to demonstrate that she had a disability due to a substantial limitation in the ability to perform manual tasks at the time of her accommodation request, she must show that her disability involved a class of manual activities affecting her ability to perform tasks at work. The Sixth Circuit disregarded the evidence of what she could do outside of work in holding that she had a disability. 

The only question before the Supreme Court was whether the Sixth Circuit applied the proper standard.  Specifically, what must a plaintiff demonstrate to establish a substantial limitation in the specific major life activity of performing manual tasks?

A unanimous Supreme Court held that to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of “central importance to most peoples' daily lives.” The manual tasks unique to any particular job are not necessarily important parts of most people's lives and may have only limited relevance to a manual task inquiry. Williams could not simply base her disability on manual tasks specific to work. Therefore, it was an error of law for the Sixth Circuit to disregard evidence of Williams’ limitations in day-to-day activities outside of work when determining that she had a disability. 

Implications of the Case:

The Supreme Court applied the definition of disability as specified by the Act and the EEOC. The term disability, with respect to an individual means

A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a).

Applying the definition in Ms.Williams case, the Court found that her medical conditions, “which include carpal tunnel syndrome, myotendinitis, and thoracic outlet compression…” were physical impairments. The Sixth Circuit ruled that William's impairment substantially limited her specific major life activity of performing manual tasks.  The Supreme Court reviewed the Sixth Circuits analysis of whether Williams was substantially limited in the major life activity of performing manual tasks. Noting that the EEOC regulations did not specify exactly what factors should be considered in proving a substantial limitation in the major life activity of performing manual tasks, the Supreme Court stepped in and crafted the standard to use in establishing whether an impairment substantially limited the specific major life activity of performing manual tasks:  

“An individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to people's daily lives. The impairment also must be permanent or long-term."4  Additionally, the EEOC’s interpretive guidance provides that such impairment must also prohibit or restrict an individual from performing a major life activity, “ as compared to the average person in the general population's ability to perform that same major life activity.”5 

The Supreme Court did not decide whether Williams had a disability as defined under the ADA.6 The Court remanded the case back to the lower courts to determine this fact-contingent issue.  When the lower courts make this determination, the plaintiff may prevail on all or part of her claims. 

Such a holding should not discourage a whole class of potential plaintiffs from pursuing their claims. Carpel tunnel syndrome was not excluded per se as a disability.  The Court reiterated the statute and EEOC regulations that disability inquiries should be made on a case-by-case basis. The Supreme Court has now presented a clearer mechanism for potential plaintiffs to present their cases. Proving the existence of an impairment is not enough; the claimant must also show how that impairment limits them. This is nothing new, the EEOC set forth this standard in its 1991 regulations, and the application of this standard has long been anticipated.7  An impairment that has symptoms that vary from person to person requires an individualized assessment of its effect. As long as plaintiffs can show that their impairments significantly hinder or prevent them from performing activities that are important to day-to-day life, they would have a disability.  Impairments that interfere in only a minor way do not qualify as disabilities. Examples of important day-to-day activities that the Supreme Court noted:

The Court noted that the Sixth Circuit did not consider these important daily activities in its analysis of Williams’s disability.  

“At the same time, the Court of Appeals appears to have disregarded the very type of evidence that it should have focused upon. It treated as irrelevant “[t]he fact that [respondent] can … ten[d] to her personal hygiene [and] carr[y] out personal or household chores.” Ibid. Yet household chores, bathing, and brushing one’s teeth are among the types of manual tasks of central importance to people’s daily lives, and should have been part of the assessment of whether respondent was substantially limited in performing manual tasks.”

In addition, even if each individual activity does not independently qualify as a major life activity, then courts can still consider them together as the major life activity of performing manual tasks. It must be stressed that this analysis applies to the major life activity of performing manual tasks. Plaintiffs can still be classified as having a disability if they can prove that their impairment substantially limits other major life activities such as walking, seeing, hearing, reproduction, etc.

By focusing on a class of manual activities specific to work, the Sixth Circuit had declared that Williams had shown that her disability was based on the substantial limitation of performing manual tasks. A focus on work-specific tasks implicates the idea of working as a major life activity: a proposition the Supreme Court had been reluctant to accept in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc:8   

“Because of the conceptual difficulties inherent in the argument that working could be a major life activity, we have been hesitant to hold as much, and we need not decide this difficult question today. In Sutton, we noted that even assuming that working is a major life activity, a claimant would be required to show an inability to work in a “broad range of jobs,” rather than a specific job.

Even if working was accepted as a major life activity, the claimant still had to prove an inability to work in a class of jobs, not a specific one9.   Alleging that one is substantially limited in working has always been a difficult hurdle.  This is especially true in employment discrimination cases where being qualified for the job is an essential element of the claim.

Individuals who allege that they have a disability, which substantially limits their ability to work encounter a tremendous evidentiary burden by having to establish that they are significantly restricted in their ability to perform a class or broad range of jobs.  This is a surprisingly strict regulatory requirement that makes it exceedingly difficult for a plaintiff who has been subjected to an adverse employment action because of a work disability to establish the full range of jobs in which their performance would be restricted.  This hurdle is especially difficult in cases where an individual is alleging that the employer regarded them as having a work disability as they must not only prove up the range of jobs they were excluded from, but also that the employer believed that there was a full range of jobs that this person was restricted from performing.  

It is important to note that the EEOC specifies in the guidance accompanying the regulations, that alleging working as a major life activity should only be done if the person is not experiencing substantial limitations in other major life activities.10

The Williams decision makes clear that from now on alleging impairments in manual tasks specific only to work, will not be enough.  Proving that one is substantially limited in performing manual tasks means that evidence must be brought forth to show that one is substantially limited in performing manual tasks in other life activities, beyond work.11 

As opposed to Sutton, which chided the EEOC for having an impermissible interpretation of the ADA , the Supreme Court in Toyota assumed that the EEOC regulations were reasonable and liberally cited them when relevant to their reasoning. Because no agency was given authority to issue regulations interpreting the term disability under the ADA12, practitioners should be cautious on relying on them13  for guidance in determining whether there is a disability. As in Sutton, the Supreme Court has refused to decide what level of deference, if any, the regulations are due.

As mentioned in the Decision Summary, much media attention has been brought to this case, and all of it seems to portend doom and gloom for proponents of the ADA.  After Toyota, how do you argue that an individual with a chronic, even cyclically impairing condition like carpal tunnel syndrome, or for that matter arthritis is, in fact, a “qualified individual with a disability that substantially limits one or more major life activities?”  How would a plaintiff’s attorney, survive a motion for summary judgment, and then convince a jury of her client’s right to an appropriate remedy?  Justice O’Conner has given you hints, if not a clearly drawn map, of which path such litigation must now follow … if the matter is even going to get a chance to get to a jury.  
For claimants trying to show that they have a disability, the Court in Toyota emphasized that establishing "a medical diagnosis of an impairment" is insufficient without proving that the impairment is substantial.  This creates a burden for litigators to bring evidence to the courts’ attention that will show that a given impairment (1) substantially limits, a (2) a major life activity.

The requirement that the disability or impairment “substantially limit” a person is a matter for the trier of fact; it is really just a test of degree.  We will therefore deal with the latter issue --- what is a major life activity?  The Court in Toyota held that working at a specific job is not a major life activity, and the Court suggested that working itself might not be a major life activity either.  This threat is disturbing inasmuch as the inability to work has been widely relied upon as a “major life activity” in many Title I cases.  So, what is a major life activity that the astute litigator may rely upon in similar cases (where the claimant is not blind, deaf, or most clearly seriously disabled)?   

The First Hint: According to the Supreme Court in Toyota, the proper test is whether an individual has "an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.  The impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long-term."  This hint is not inconsistent with previous understanding about the nature of a covered disability --- An understanding that you must look to permanence.  Disability is not injury in the ADA context inasmuch as an injury may not be permanent.  Here you look to prognosis rather than diagnosis.  This seems a rather clear hint.

The Second Hint: Less clear in the decision, the focus of any disability inquiry under the ADA now must go beyond specific job, and include any of a whole range of possible activities that are viewed as being central to most people’s lives.  In Toyota, the Court specified "household chores, bathing, and brushing one’s teeth" as examples of these central life functions. However, the Court in a curious review of the facts seemed to view some similar limitations offered by the claimant in Toyota as insignificant.  These “insignificant” factors, such as having to at times, “avoid sweeping, to quit dancing, to occasionally seek help dressing, and to reduce how often she plays with her children, gardens, and drives long distances" were not considered by the Court to be central to people’s lives.  This seems to suggest that although you are to do an individualized evaluation of the impact of a particular impairment, or diagnosed disability, that limitation must affect that person in a manner that resonates with a broad range of the general population.  

This hint, while not lending a great deal of clarification to the matter, may actually allow for an expansion of the definition of major life activity.  The clever litigator must seek to contextualize the facts of their particular client’s disability in a way that tells the story of the limitation that the disability brings to that person’s life, and to do so in a manner that will resonate with the triers of fact.  This Court’s expanding consideration of what constitutes a major life activity is really not too surprising given it’s analysis in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), where the Court found that reproduction was a major life activity in context of an individual with asymptomatic, but HIV+, status.  Additionally, this Court indicated in Toyota that it embraces the broad list of major life activities under the Rehabilitation Act regulations that includes such life functions as "‘walking, seeing, hearing’. . . ‘performing manual tasks.’" 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2001). The Court further refers to tasks involving personal hygiene and personal or household chores as important examples.  

This foray into “areas of central importance” may allow for an expansion of the definition of major life activity so long as the life activity meets some common sense relationship to what most people view as important.  In Toyota, it is not so important that Williams needed occasional help with self-care activities --- it is caring for oneself that would be the major life activity, and the occasional need for assistance would be facts in support of that need.  Similarly, it is not that she had to stop picking up her granddaughter because of her impairment, it is caring for one’s family that might be a major life activity, and the limitations on picking up her granddaughter that support the limitation.  

The Third Hint: The Court in Toyota held that the Sixth Circuit erred by assuming that a "‘class’ of . . . activities must be implicated for an impairment to substantially limit [a] major life activity. . . . " This requirement only applies to the life activity of working, not to other life activities.  This reasoning can now be used in other cases to possibly expand the disability definition, particularly in the context of the Court’s view that major life functions include many activities that go beyond working, and perhaps necessary inasmuch as the Court suggested in dicta that working may not be a major life activity.  

The Fourth Hint: The Court here endorses the proposition that disability must be determined on a “case by case” basis that considers the individual’s diagnosis, symptoms and limitations. This is the same type of individualized assessment detailed in the determination of “direct threat” as set forth in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), where assessments of disability are required to be objective processes that determine "‘[t]he nature and severity of the impairment; [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and [t]he permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the impairment.’" 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(2)(i)–(iii). Similarly, Justice O’Connor describes in the Toyota opinion, that this process is most important in light of the type of condition in the underlying facts of the Toyota case --- carpal tunnel syndrome --- where the condition brings a vast array of different symptoms, and varying levels of impairment, and responds to treatment in a varying, and highly individualistic manner.

Conclusion: So, in light of the Toyota decision … what does a clever litigator, concerned advocate, or an individual without a “clearly” disabling condition do?  Answer: little different than he or she did before.  The key will be to: 1) present facts sufficient to be in controversy in order to survive summary judgment, 2) to contextualize the impairment(s) in terms of a generally accepted major life activity or activities and to develop the facts in a compelling manner that tell a story that will engage triers of fact, and  3) utilize work as major life activity only as a last choice.  

Footnotes:
1 CNN.  January 8, 2002. http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/01/08/scotus.disability/index.html
2 Latimes.com
3 Latimes.com
4 The Supreme Court citing EEOC regulation: 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(2) (ii)(iii)
5  Appendix to 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j) (1999)
6  Even though they commented "... these changes in her life did not amount to such severe restrictions in the activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives that they establish a manual-task disability as a matter of law."
7  Section 1630.2(j) substantially limits
“Determining whether a physical or mental impairment exists is only the first step in determining whether or not an individual is disabled. Many impairments do not impact an individual's life to the degree that they constitute disabling impairments. An impairment rises to the level of disability if the impairment substantially limits one or more of the individual's major life activities. Multiple impairments that combine to substantially limit one or more of an individual's major life activities also constitute a disability.”
8 527 U.S. 471 (1999).  
9  See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3).
10  Section 1630.2(j) substantially limits
“If an individual is not substantially limited with respect to any other major life activity, the individual's ability to perform the major life activity of working should be considered. If an individual is substantially limited in any other major life activity, no determination should be made as to whether the individual is substantially limited in working. For example, if an individual is blind, i.e., substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing, there is no need to determine whether the individual is also substantially limited in the major life activity of working.”
11  “Even more critically, the manual tasks unique to any particular job are not necessarily important parts of most people’s lives. As a result, occupation-specific tasks may have only limited relevance to the manual task inquiry. In this case, “repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time,” 224 F.3d, at 843, the manual task on which the Court of Appeals relied, is not an important part of most people’s daily lives. The court, therefore, should not have considered respondent’s inability to do such manual work in her specialized assembly line job as sufficient proof that she was substantially limited in performing manual tasks.
12  Disagreeing with 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. §1630.2(j) (1998) that people are to be evaluated in their hypothetical uncorrected state
13  Along with any Department of Justice regulations attempting to define the term. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104; 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.


The Legal E-bulletin is distributed monthly for subscribers interested in a  comprehensive review of litigation that is occurring on a national and regional level in regard to the Americans with Disabilities Act and other disability related laws. The bulletin is intended to provide technical assistance and information on the litigation that is shaping the meaning of the ADA and other laws.  The mission of the DLRP is to promote proactive compliance with the ADA in Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico and Oklahoma. Based at ILRU (Independent Living Research Utilization), a program of TIRR in Houston, Texas, the DLRP is funded by NIDRR, an agency of the Department of Education, under grant #H133D60012, to provide information, materials, and technical assistance on the ADA. NIDRR is not an enforcement agency.

Project staff are also available at 800-949-4232 from 9:00a.m.–5:00p.m. Central Time to answer your ADA questions. All questions are answered confidentially.  The information herein is intended solely as informal guidance and is neither a determination of your legal rights or responsibilities under the Act, nor binding on any agency with enforcement responsibility under the ADA.

The information herein is intended solely as informal guidance and is neither a determination of your legal rights or responsibilities under the Act, nor binding on any agency with enforcement responsibility under the ADA.

To unsubscribe to the legal E-bulletin, or to subscribe to the general or HR E-bulletin, to ask a question or give a comment, please send an E-mail to swdbtac@ilru.org.  All questions are answered confidentially.

You are welcome to reproduce all or part of the text on this web page electronically or in print, crediting as your source the Southwest ADA Center at ILRU. We would greatly appreciate receiving a copy of your use of our material. Please send to:

Tajauna Dunning, Communications Director
Southwest ADA Center
2323 S. Shepherd #1000
Houston, Texas 77019
713-520-0232 (v/tty)
713-520-5785 (fax)
tdunning@ilru.org

©DLRP, All Rights Reserved

Outside Links will Open Up in a New Window
contact us: DBTAC Southwest ADA Center
800-949-4232 or 713-520-0232 v/tty